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The California Constitutional Right of Privacy and
Exclusion of Evidence in Civil Proceedings
The prevailing view at common law was that the admissibility
of evidence was not affected by the illegality or impropriety of its
procurement.' The United States Supreme Court in Weeks v.
United States,2 however, fashioned a rule rendering evidence
inadmissible in federal criminal prosecutions when obtained by
federal officers in violation of fourth amendment protections of in-
dividual privacy against unreasonable search and seizure.3 The
fourth amendment exclusionary rule is now well established in
both federal and state courts where state action in the procure-
ment of evidence for criminal prosecutions is involved.4 However,
the application of exclusionary principles relating to the methods
and propriety of evidence gathering in noncriminal cases has not
1. 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 408, at 466-67 (1967); 4 B. JONES ON EVIDENCE §
868 (5th ed. 1958); J. McBAINE, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE MANUAL § 261, at 83, Supp. 54-
57 (2d ed. 1960 + Supp. 1977); C. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 137 (1954); 8 J. WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE § 2183, at 6-8 (J. McNaughten rev. 1961).
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. The Court in Weeks also relied on the fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination in excluding evidence obtained in violation of fourth amend-
ment rights. The relationship of the fifth amendment to the exclusion of evidence
in federal criminal cases was further developed by the Court in Gouled v. U.S., 255
U.S. 298 (1921). The scope of this comment, however, will be limited to an exami-
nation of fourth amendment principles underlying the exclusionary rule as pro-
pounded in Weeks and as subsequently adopted by the California courts based on
the fourth amendment and Art. I § 13 of the California Constitution guarantying
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
4. The expansion of this rule to include state criminal proceedings was first
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule was held applicable to the states under the
fourteenth amendment. For a thorough analysis of the fourth amendment princi-
ples underlying this decision see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MowN. L. REV. 349 (1974). It must be noted that both Mapp and
Weeks dealt with the exclusion of evidence obtained by law enforcement agents,
i.e., where state action was involved. Subsequent to Weeks, the Court held in Bur-
deau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), that evidence unlawfully obtained by a pri-
vate individual was not subject to exclusion on the ground that the fourth
amendment was inapplicable in the absence of state action. In Mapp, the Court
did not overrule Burdeau, but merely extended the Weeks rule to apply to acts of
the states. See notes 16 & 17 infra and accompanying text. In the forty-seven year
period between Weeks and Mapp, states had the discretion to follow the exclu-
sionary rule announced in Weeks or to observe the general common law view of
admissibility. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
been uniform, with courts in various jurisdictions reaching sur-
prisingly diverse results.5 The primary focus of this comment is
to analyze the development of the fourth amendment criminal
law exclusionary rule in California and to trace the expansion of
its rationale into areas of noncriminal proceedings.6 Special em-
phasis will be placed on the rationale for expansion of exclusion-
ary principles and the relationship between exclusion of evidence
improperly obtained and concerns for individual privacy.
There have been no California cases directly addressing the is-
sue of exclusion of evidence obtained in a manner invasive of the
right of privacy e'tablished by the California Constitution in
"purely"7 civil cases.8 Thus, an examination of California court
decisions relating to the exclusion of evidence wrongfully pro-
cured in other types of proceedings is advantageous in two as-
pects: first, to project possible reactions of the courts when faced
with such a situation and, second, to provide a background for
proposal of a "new" exclusionary rule for purely civil cases based
on the express California Constitutional right of privacy. 9 These
decisions will be divided into the following categories for pur-
poses of analysis: (1) criminal proceedings, (2) "quasi-criminal"
proceedings, and (3) administrative hearings10
I. CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Prior to People v. Cahan," decided in 1955, California courts
generally held that illegally or improperly obtained evidence was
admissible in criminal, as well as civil proceedings.12 The Califor-
5. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968);
Annot., 5 A.L.R. 3d 670, 676-80 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence Ille-
gally Obtained by Private Parties, 72 YALE L.J. 1062 (1963).
6. Although there are numerous situations in which evidence is excluded
from consideration at trial, this comment will deal only with the exclusion of evi-
dence based on the manner and method of its procurement. See note 106 infra
dealing with the three main bodies of the law of evidence regarding limitations on
admissibility.
7. The term "purely" is used throughout the text to signify those actions in-
stituted by a private individual against another where no state agencies are di-
rectly involved, e.g., administrative proceedings, and where the action is not
criminal in effect. See note 18 infra.
8. Note 4 supra.
9. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1 (West Supp. 1977) which reads as follows: "All peo-
ple are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." (emphasis
added).
10. This is a somewhat arbitrary division and, thus, there will be some una-
voidable overlap between the categories.
11. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
12. 19 CAL. JuR. 3d § 1020, at 110-11, § 1029, at 122-23 (1975); J. McBAINE, CAU-
FORNIA EVIDENCE MANUAL § 262, at 84 (2d ed. 1960); B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA Evi-
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nia Supreme Court in Cahan announced an exclusionary rule ap-
plicable to criminal cases where evidence was procured by state
officers in a manner violative of constitutional protections.13 The
majority in Cahan relied on the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, section 13, of the California
Constitution14 as authority for creation of the California exclu-
sionary rule. Justice Traynor writing for the majority states:
'Thus both the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution make it empatically clear that important as efficient
law enforcement may be, it is more important that the right of
privacy guaranteed by these constitutional provisions be
respected."15
Although recognizing that neither the United States nor Califor-
nia Constitutions required exclusion of evidence to protect pri-
vacy rights, the court held the exclusionary rule to be an
appropriate remedy for violations of such rights.16 The Court ex-
pressed four reasons for its decision: (1) the court should not be a
party to "dirty business", (2) constitutional guarantees of privacy
were not being effectively protected by existing sanctions, (3) the
deterrent effect of such a rule on illegal police conduct and (4) the
DENCE § 49, at 51 (2d ed. 1966). The leading cases of People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237,
205 P.435 (1922) and People v. LaDoux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 P. 517 (1909), which es-
poused the common law rule of unfettered admissibility of evidence regardless of
its unlawful procurement were expressly overruled in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d
434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). See also note 1 supra as to the admissibility of evidence
in civil proceedings to which California has generally adhered.
13. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). In Cahan, the defend-
ant was convicted of conspiracy to engage in horse-race bookmaking with fifteen
other persons. A portion of the evidence presented at trial and admitted over de-
fendants' objection consisted of audio recordings of various defendants and addi-
tional evidence obtained by forcible entries and seizures by police without search
warrants. The recordings were made by police officers who secretly entered two of
the defendant's homes and installed listening devices with receiving equipment
set up in a nearby location.
14. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution states:
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated, and a warrant
may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized."
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
15. 44 Cal.2d at 438, 282 P.2d at 907 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 440, 282 P.2d at 908-09.
argument that some criminals may go free was an invalid criti-
cism of a rule intended to further constitutional protections.17
Since Cahan, the major developments in criminal law concern-
ing fourth amendment rights have involved the concept of reason-
able search and seizure. 18 The basic rationales supporting the
judicially created exclusionary rule, however, have remained
largely unchanged. 19
In Cahan and subsequent criminal cases that have invoked the
exclusionary rule, the evidence excluded was unlawfully procured
by governmental law enforcement officers. The California
Supreme Court has adhered strictly to the doctrine enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in Burdeau v. McDoweUl20 that
evidence obtained by wrongful means in connection with criminal
proceedings by private individuals not associated with state
agents is fully admissible. 21 The California courts have consist-
ently held the exclusionary rule applicable only to acts of the
state, while evidence obtained by private individuals has been
routinely admitted regardless of the manner of its acquisition. 22
IL QUASI-CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 23
California has also adhered to the view promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court extending the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule to cases that are technically civil but "quasi-
criminal" in effect.24 The first time the California Supreme Court
17. Id. at 445-50, 282 P.2d at 910-12. See notes 66, 70, 73 & 78 infra and accompa-
nying text for a further discussion of the Cahan rationale.
18. These developments are beyond the scope of this comment. However, for
further information on the subject, see B. MARTIN, COMPREHENSIVE CALIFORNIA
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 29 (1971); E. YOUNGER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 21 (1972); Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
19. See note 86 infra relating to the recent changes in the "judicial integrity"
rationale.
20. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
21. People v. Moreno, 64 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 23, 135 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1976) (pri-
vate security officer employed by a retail store observed shoplifting activities of
defendant through the louvered door of a dressing room); People v. Wachter, 58
Cal. App. 3d 911, 130 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1976) (an off-duty sheriff, while on a fishing
trip, found marijuana growing on the defendants' farm); People v. Randazzo, 220
Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963) (retail store detective observed shoplifting
by defendant by lying on the floor and looking under a partition of a dressing room
into the enclosure occupied by defendant); People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870,
315 P.2d 468 (1957) (employer borrowed employees' car with consent and searched
the trunk discovering stolen items which were subsequently turned over to po-
lice).
22. Id.
23. This term is used to denote proceedings which, although civil in nature,
are criminal in effect, e.g., where penalties, confinement or forfeitures are
involved.
24. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693
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applied the exclusionary rule of Cahan in such a manner was in
People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe,25 involving a car used in the
unlawful transportation of marijuana, where the court stated:
Whatever the label which may be attached to the proceeding, it is appar-
ent that the purpose of the forfeiture is deterrent in nature and that there
is a close identity to the aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement.
On policy the same exclusionary rules should apply to improper state con-
duct whether the proceeding contemplates the deprivation of one's liberty
or property.26
Subsequently, the supreme court in People v. Moore27 reached
the same result when the question of admissibility of evidence
seized by state officers was raised in the context of a civil narcotic
addict commitment proceeding.28 However, the court there intro-
duced a somewhat different rationale in applying the criminal law
exclusionary rules. In a six to one decision, the court created a
"balancing test," holding: "whether any particular rule of criminal
practice should be applied . ..depends upon consideration of the
relationship of the policy underlying the rule to the
proceedings."29
Applying this test to the facts in Moore, the court reasoned that
the primary policy of the exclusionary rule was "to deter uncon-
stitutional methods of law enforcement" so that the state would
"not profit from its own wrong."3 0 The nature of the commitment
proceeding here, although beneficial to both the addict and to so-
ciety, involved a loss of liberty and, thus, was closely akin to crim-
inal law objectives.3 1 In considering the interrelationship of these
(1965) (forfeiture proceedings); See also B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 56, at
60 (2d ed. 1966).
25. 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1964).
26. Id. at 96-7, 396 P.2d at 709, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
27. 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968).
28. Under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3100 (West 1972), a person may be invol-
untarily committed to a state rehabilitation center upon the states' showing of ad-
diction to narcotics or imminent danger of such addiction. In Moore, police officers
detained the defendant in a parking lot and in the course of questioning him ob-
tained evidence which was subsequently admitted in the commitment proceeding.
On appeal the court found the police detention to have been without reasonable
cause and therefore that ali evidence obtained pursuant to the detention was inad-
missible. The court stated that. "[T]he guarantees against unreasonable searches
and seizures as contained in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are applica-
ble to police officers seeking to enforce the criminal laws .... [Tihe guarantees
are also applicable to governmental officials seeking to enforce health and safety
regulations." People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d at 679, 446 P.2d at 803, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
29. 69 Cal. 2d at 681-82, 446 P.2d at 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 805 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 682, 446 P.2d at 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
31. Id.
factors, the court found that the "criminal law" nature of this pro-
ceeding provided law enforcement officers with an incentive to vi-
olate the fourth and fourteenth amendments and, therefore, held
the exclusionary rule applicable to protect the rights of those fac-
ing such commitment proceedings. 32
Two years later the California Supreme Court in In Re
Martinez33 further developed this "balancing test" in the context
of a parole revocation proceeding.34 In balancing the costs to soci-
ety of extending the exclusionary rule against the nature of the
proceeding, the Court concluded that the social consequences
outweighed the interests of the parolee under the parole revoca-
tion proceeding and admitted evidence obtained by a police of-
ficer which would have been excluded if introduced in a criminal
proceeding.35
It now appears that the California courts are willing to apply
criminal law exclusionary principles in many quasi-criminal
cases. Where application of the Moore and Martinez "balancing
test" reveal that the nature of the proceedings and individual in-
terests involved outweighs the cost to society of expanding exclu-
sionary principles, such rules will be invoked.
III. ADMINISTRATiVE PROCEEDINGS
The recent dynamic growth of administrative agencies through-
out California creates some difficulty in summarizing the extent
to which established judicial rules of evidence apply in adminis-
trative proceedings. To facilitate and simplify analysis of the
manner in which the California courts have dealt with the appli-
cability of the exclusionary rule in such proceedings, those agen-
cies in which the issue has most frequently arisen will be
classified under three general categories: 1) state and local regula-
tory boards; 2) state bar proceedings; and, 3) state agencies with
judicial powers. 36
32. Id.
33. 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970).
34. The defendant in In re Martinez had his parole revoked because of a nar-
cotics conviction received while on parole. This conviction was reversed on the
basis of a violation of the fifth amendment under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) and an unlawful search and seizure by the police. Although defendant then
appealed the parole revocation decision, the revocation was ultimately affirmed by
the California Supreme Court. Id.
35. Id. at 650-51, 463 P.2d at 740-41, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
36. See S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE, Administrative Proceedings § 30:1, at
325-29 (6th ed. 1972) and B. WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, §§ 21-22, at 22-24 (2d ed.
1966) for additional information on classification of administrative agencies.
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A. State and Local Regulatory Boards
In California, numerous state and local administrative bodies
regulate the licensing, maintenance and discipline of various busi-
nesses and professional services.37 The exclusionary issue has
arisen most often in cases involving disciplinary hearings before
the State Board of Medical Examiners.3 8 Relying on two previous
California Supreme Court decisions 39 the First District Court of
Appeal in Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners40 assumed that
the criminal law exclusionary rules were applicable in license rev-
ocation proceedings. The California Supreme Court denied a
hearing in Elder, but, subsequently, in Emslie v. State Bar of
California 41 which involved disbarment proceedings, stated that:
"such denial (in Elder) is not to be regarded as expressing ap-
proval of a categorical rule that the exclusionary rules of the crim-
inal law apply in license revocation proceedings merely because a
penalty is involved."42 It now appears that the California
Supreme Court has impliedly rejected mechanical application of
the criminal law exclusionary rule in state regulatory proceedings
in favor of the "balancing test" utilized in Moore and Martinez.43
In a 1974 case appealing the decision of a local school board dis-
missing an elementary school teacher for sexual misconduct, the
Second District Court of Appeal, applying the "balancing test,"
ruled that the criminal law exclusionary rules were inapplicable
in that particular administrative proceeding." Society's interest
in protecting school children was found to outweigh the punitive
character of the proceeding and the personal interest of the
37. Nearly all the major state agencies regulating businesses and professions
are now subject to the procedural provisions of the California Procedure Act
adopted in 1945. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11500 (West 1966).
38. Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners, 9 Cal. 3d 356, 508 P. 2d 1121, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 473 (1973) (disciplinary action for alleged illegal sale of restricted drugs by
physician); Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners, 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 50 Cal. Rptr.
304 (1966) (Court of Appeal reversed and remanded a decision by the Medical
Board revoking petitioner's license to practice medicine for alleged abuses in au-
thorizing the refilling of prescription drugs).
39. People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr.
290 (1964); Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 P.39 (1906). The
policy considerations for both of these decisions relate to the need for exclusion-
ary rule protection where proceedings may deprive one of his liberty or property.
40. 241 Cal. App.2d 246, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1966).
41. 11 Cal.3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1974).
42. Id. at 229, 520 P.2d at 1001, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
43. Id. at 229-30, 520 P.2d 1002, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86.
44. Governing Board v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974).
teacher involved. 45
B. State Bar Proceedings
Although similar to state licensing and regulatory boards, State
Bar disciplinary proceedings are recognized as having a unique
administrative nature.46 The California Supreme Court has, on
numerous occasions, described the purpose of the State Bar Act
as one of protecting the public and the legal profession from those
persons incompetent or otherwise unfit for the provision of legal
services. 47
Addressing squarely the issue of admissibility of evidence pro-
cured in a devious manner by private security guards, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Emslie v. State Bar of California48 held
that the criminal law exclusionary rule should not be mechanical-
ly applied to State Bar disciplinary proceedings. Rather, the "bal-
ancing test" formulated in Moore and Martinez was employed. In
admitting the challenged evidence the Court unanimously held
that the interests involved in protecting the attorney by invoking
the exclusionary rule and the detrimental effects on the integrity
of the judicial process should the rule not be applied were out-
weighed by the social interests of protecting the public and the le-
gal profession from unscrupulous attorneys. 4 9 The Court,
however, refused to speculate on the applicability of exclusionary
rules in other types of administrative licensing proceedings, stat-
ing: "[T]he application of such rules must be worked out on a
case-by-case basis in this and other license revocation proceed-
ings."5 0
45. Id. at 551 nn. 3&4, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 727, 728 nn.3&4. The court did, however,
recognize that exclusionary principles have been applied in various types of non-
criminal proceedings.
46. Emslie v. State Bar of California, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1974); Johnson v. State Bar of California, 4 Cal. 2d 744, 52 P.2d 928 (1935): In re
Danford, 157 Cal. 425, 108 P.322 (1910). As such, they are not governed directly by
civil or criminal rules of procedure, however, such rules are used to safeguard
rights to administrative due process when necessary.
47. Note 46 supra. See also Black v. State Bar of California, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 499
P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1972); Dudney v. State Bar of California, 8 Cal. 2d 555,
66 P.2d 1199 (1937).
48. 11 Cal. 3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1974). The Emslie opinion is
emphasized here because it is illustrative of the present position of the California
Supreme Court as to the applicability of exclusionary principles in administrative
hearings. It also clearly demonstrates the court's preference for the "balancing
test" approach to exclusionary rule application.
49. Id. at 229, 520 P.2d at 1002, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
50. Id. at 230, 520 P.2d at 1002, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 186, where the court stated:
"[T]he application of such rules must be worked out on a case-by-case basis in
this and other license revocation proceedings."
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C. State Agencies With Judicial Powers
There are a number of state administrative bodies created with
provisions which make them, in some aspects, equivalent to
courts. One such body is the Worker's Compensation Appeals
Board.5 1 In a landmark case dealing with the admissibility of evi-
dence wrongfully obtained in a Worker's Compensation proceed-
ing, a unanimous decision by the supreme court in Redner v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board52 stated that:
[TIhe high purposes of the compensation law should not be perverted by
resort to evidence perfidiously procured... the board may not rely upon
evidence obtained ... by deceitful inducement of an applicant to engage
in activities which he would not otherwise have undertaken ... we cannot
sanction the carriers' attempt to profit by its deceitful inducement ... The
legal process cannot be stultified by crowning such amoral maneuvers with
apparent success.
5 3
Prior to Redner the courts had refused to exclude fraudulently
obtained motion picture film from Worker's Compensation hear-
ings. 54 Thus, the supreme court's decision in Redner was a depar-
ture from the traditional rules of evidence in compensation cases
which had previously admitted all probative evidence regardless
of the manner in which it was obtained. The exclusionary rule
propounded in Redner was based on two broad principles. First,
the imperative of judicial fairness and, second, denial of unjust
51. See W. HANNA, THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAWS OF CALIFORNIA, Depart-
ment of Industrial Accidents § 1.02, at 1-6, 1-17 (2d ed. 1977) for an in depth discus-
sion of the background, purposes and procedures of the Worker's Compensation
Appeals Board.
52. 5 Cal. 3d 83, 485 P.2d 799, 95 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1971). Redner, the Worker's
Compensation applicant, was initially found to have a 57% permanent disability
by the Worker's Compensation referee and began receiving such benefits. Subse-
quently, private investigators retained by his employers' Worker's Compensation
carrier befriended Redner and invited him to a party held at a ranch where a great
number of mixed drinks were served. Redner became inebriated and was induced
to go horseback riding. While concealed in a barn on the ranch premises, the in-
vestigators took motion pictures of Redner riding, saddling, and walking a horse.
The appeals board then granted a reconsideration of Redners' case, and based on
the motion picture evidence, held that he should receive no permanent disability
compensation.
53. Id. at 95, 97, 485 P.2d at 807, 809, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 455-57 (emphasis added).
54. See Carson v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 31 Cal. Comp. Cases 291
(1966). Rather than excluding such evidence, the courts prior to Redner left the
applicant to seek redress for this wrong by instituting a separate action for inva-
sion of privacy where the intrusion involved would have been objectionable or of-
fensive to the reasonable man. See Shernoff, The Demise of the Sub Rosa
Investigation, 45 STATE BAR J. 853. Additional factors involved in bringing such an
action will be discussed infra.
enrichment to those attempting to profit by their wrongdoing.55
It has been suggested that the rationale advanced in Redner
may have a potentially broad effect on the admissibility of evi-
dence in all civil cases.5 6 Although the statements in Redner were
phrased in broad terms and the logic of excluding such evidence
in "purely" civil cases where there are more formalized rules of
evidence is seemingly sound, the supreme court has yet to ex-
pressly expand the Redner holding in the context of purely civil
proceedings.
It has also been suggested that if rules of evidence in civil pro-
ceedings are designed "to promote efficient fact finding and to
best elicit the truth", there is no sound reason to apply different
rules in administrative tribunals where resolution of fact is also
the primary objective.57 However, as explained in Redner, the
Worker's Compensation Appeals Board is not bound by such
common law or statutory rules and may prefer to make inquiries
in a manner "best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of
the parties and carry out justly the spirit and provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation laws." 58 It may be reasonably inferred
from the unanimous opinion in Redner that the supreme court's
attitude toward excluding evidence wrongfully obtained in a situ-
ation where rules of evidence are relaxed indicates an outlook
amenable to ruling similarly in situations where more formalized
and rigid rules of evidence are applied.
It is important to note the marked departure of the courts from
the traditional rule of admissibility of evidence which governed
California for over one hundred years.59 In the relatively brief pe-
riod since Cahan, the California courts have expanded the rules
of exclusion from criminal proceedings into "quasi-criminal" ac-
tions as well as into administrative hearings on a case-by-case ba-
sis.60 Thus, the climate appears to be favorable for a further
expansion of exclusionary principles into "purely" civil proceed-
ings, particularly where rights of individual privacy are con-
cerned.
55. 5 Cal. 3d 83, 485 P.2d 799, 95 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1971).
56. Note, Fraudulently Obtained Films, 60 CAL. L REV. 918, 921 (1972) where
the author states: "[W]hile the discussion of the grounds for involving appellate
review relates only to workmen's compensation cases, the underlying rationale of
the exclusionary rule is applicable to civil trial proceedings as well."
57. S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE, Nature of Evidence § 1:9, at 12 (6th ed. 1972).
58. 5 Cal. 3d at 95, 485 P.2d at 807, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56.
59. See notes 9&10 supra.
60. See notes 24 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. PROPOSAL OF A "NEW" EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOR CIVIL CASES
It is appropriate to note here that courts in a few other states
have addressed the issue of exclusion of evidence wrongfully ob-
tained in "purely" civil cases with divergent results.61 Ohio and
New Jersey courts have held that evidence unlawfully acquired
by private individuals was inadmissible in civil proceedings.62
The holdings in these cases, however, were based on interpreta-
tions of Mapp v. Ohio63 applying the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule equally to civil and criminal proceedings. Although
not expressly overruled in their jurisdictions, the validity of these
decisions is highly questionable today in view of United States
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Mapp restricting its ef-
fect to criminal cases where state action is involved.64 Adopting
an alternative approach, the Florida Supreme Court, in a 1973
holding, excluded evidence wrongfully obtained by a private indi-
vidual in a marriage dissolution action, basing the ruling on a
state wiretap statute enacted for the protection of individual pri-
vacy.65
61. See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R. 3d 670, 676-80 (1966) and text infra.
62. Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 NJ.Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (1966) (motion to
suppress evidence in a divorce case granted where plaintiff and private investiga-
tors secured evidence by illegal entry into defendants' home); Williams v. Wil-
liams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E. 2d 622 (1966) (motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence in a divorce proceeding where the husband took letters
from the wife's automobile without consent).
63. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also note 4 supra.
64. See Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained by
Private Parties, 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1072 (1963) where the author states that:
[A]lthough the considerations underlying the federal exclusionary rule do
not appear to warrant its extension to cases of evidence unlawfully seized
by private persons and submitted in civil or criminal suits, the question of
whether an exclusionary rule to govern such cases is justified, independ-
ent of the rationale of the federal exclusionary rule, remains.
See also Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 83, 203 N.E. 2d 481, 5 A.L.R.
3d 664 (1964) where the Court of Appeals of New York held that neither state nor
federal prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures required exclu-
sion of evidence in a divorce proceeding which was illegally obtained by the hus-
band-plaintiff and several private investigators employed by him. The court relied
on the United States Supreme Court decision in Burdeau v. McDowell in holding
that the fourth amendment was intended only as a restraint upon acts of the state
and rejected defendants' contention that Mapp v. Ohio overruled Burdeau princi-
ples.
65. Markham v. Markham, 272 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1973); see also Note, Evidence Il-
legally Seized by a Private Person Excluded from Civil Proceedings, 26 FLA. L
REV. 166 (1973). The author, commenting on Markham, advances an argument rel-
evant to the situation in California regarding the right of privacy. He states:
[Tlhe Florida Constitution provides another ground for excluding the evi-
A. Background On The Right Of Privacy
Before discussing the merits of a creation of a "new" civil exclu-
sionary rule based on the California constitutional right of pri-
vacy, it is necessary to consider the political background and
judicial constructions of this newly expressed right.
The United States Supreme Court and various state courts have
had to make rather contorted efforts to arrive at a recognizable
constitutional right of privacy.66 California courts are no longer
constrained to do so since the passage of the 1972 amendment to
the California Constitution expressly giving personal privacy
rights to all Californians. 67 In California tort law, however, "inva-
sion of privacy" has been long recognized and is now a well de-
fined area of law. 68
The only "legislative history" of California's constitutional right
of privacy is set forth in the election brochure argument favoring
voter adoption of the provision in the 1972 statewide election.69
The brochure argument delineates three primary points as to the
purpose and scope of the constitutional right of privacy. First, it
identifies four basic "mischiefs" which the amendment intended
to remedy: (1) "government snooping," that is, gathering of per-
sonal information; (2) overbroad collection of unnecessary per-
sonal information by governmental and business interests; (3) the
improper use of information properly obtained for a specific pur-
pose; and (4) the lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy of
dence wrongfully seized in the instant case. The constitution secures a
general right of privacy by providing that people shall be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and unreasonable interceptions of private
communications .... The instant case extends the constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy to intrusions by private parties by requiring the ex-
clusion of evidence seized by electronic eavesdropping. Arguably, this
extension should also apply to physical searches and seizures. Since a
Ehysical intrusion violates a person's privacy just as much as an intrusion
y wiretapping, a search and seizure by trespass should also be within the
scope of the constitutional guarantee. The instant decision could support
the extension of constitutional exclusionary rule to all evidence unreason-
ably seized by private individuals and sought to be introduced into any ju-
dicial proceeding.
66. See Note, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 64 CAL. L. REV. 347,
352 n. 42 (1976).
67. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (West Supp. 1977).
68. L JOHNS, CAuFORmNA DAMAGES LAw AND PROOF, Invasion of Privacy §§
11.1-11.3, at 361-63 (2d ed. 1977); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 117, at 804-14 (4th ed. 1964).
See also Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 62 Cal. App.3d 310,
132 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1976); Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 33 Cal. App.3d 654, 109
Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973).
69. See California Voters Pamphlet (1972); Carter v. Commissioner on Qualifi-
cations. etc., 14 Cal.2d 179, 93 P.2d 140 (1939); In re Quinn, 35 Cal. App. 3d 473, 110
Cal. Rptr. 881 (1975) as to the use of election brochure arguments in constructions
of constitutional provisions passed pursuant to a vote of the people.
[VoL 6: 231, 1978] Exclusionary Rule in Civil Proceedings
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
existing records.70 Second, the argument clearly indicates that
the amendment does not per se prohibit all encroachments upon
individual privacy, but requires a compelling interest for any such
invasions.7 1 Third, the statement points out that the constitu-
tional provision "creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy
for every Californian" indicating that the amendment is "self exe-
cuting," that is, it provides for a private cause of action based on
the privacy provision.7 2
The new privacy amendment was first (and, at this writing,
most extensively) discussed by the California Supreme Court in
White v. Davis.73 The court stated in a unanimous opinion that:
[A]lthough the general concept of privacy relates ... to an enormously
broad and diverse field of personal action and belief, the moving force be-
hind the new constitutional provision was a more focused privacy concern,
relating to the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and secur-
ity caused by increased surveillance and data collection activity in con-
temporary society. The new provisions' primary purpose is to afford
individuals some measure of protection against this most modern threat
to personal privacy.
7 4
In White the court viewed the particular facts as clearly fitting
within the protection against the "government snooping" aspect
of the new privacy right.75 The court, however, did not expand
upon the scope of protections cognizable within the other pur-
poses of the privacy provision as set forth in the brochure argu-
ment.
The First District Court of Appeal in Porten v. University of San
Francisco,76 discussed the purpose of the constitutional privacy
provisions to remedy the "improper use of information properly
70. California Voters Pamphlet (1972) (emphasis added).
71. Id.
72. Id. See also White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1975).
73. 13 Cal.3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). White involved police
officers conducting covert surveillance of college classes while posing as students,
thus enabling police to compile extensive dossiers on professors and students.
74. Id. at 773-74, 533 P. 2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 775-76, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106, where the court stated:
"In several respects, the police surveilance operation ... epitomizes the kind of
governmental conduct which the new Constitutional amendment condemns ...
routine stationing of ... police agents ... constitutes 'governmental snooping' in
the extreme."
76. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976). Porten involved an alleged
misconduct on the part of the defendant-university in disclosing plaintiffs' grades
(earned at a prior university) to the State Scholarship and Loan Commission in
violation of an alleged understanding that such grades would be used only for pur-
poses of evaluating plaintiffs' admission to the defendant-university.
obtained for a specific purpose. '77 Although the plaintiffs' allega-
tions failed to state a cause of action based on the traditional tort
of "invasion of privacy," the complaint was held to constitute a
prima facie violation of the constitutional right of privacy.78 The
court in Porten apparently sensed the expansive intent of the
supreme court in White where constitutionally protected rights of
privacy are at stake. Further, the Porten court definitively stated
what the supreme court had alluded to in White, noting that:
"[PJrivacy is protected not merely against state action, it is con-
sidered an inalienable right which may not be violated by any-
one. "
7 9
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that the constitu-
tional right of privacy was intended to protect against intrusive
acts of private individuals as well as against those of the sover-
eign. It is suggested here that the scope of privacy rights pro-
tected by this provision should extend to include invasions of
privacy by private litigants intended to reap evidentiary fruit for
use in pending or contemplated legal actions. If, as in Porten, the
"improper use of information properly obtained for a special pur-
pose" is within the ambit of constitutional protection, then in-
formation improperly obtained for such use should certainly fall
within such protections.8 0
As previously stated, the purpose of this comment is to ex-
amine whether the creation of a new exclusionary rule would be
an appropriate and necessary protection for constitutional privacy
violations. As the supreme court in White stated, the purpose of
the privacy provision is to "afford individuals some measure of
protection" from threats to personal privacy.8 ' The injunction
sought and granted in White was found to be an adequate "meas-
ure of protection" for the specific privacy right violated.82 Since
White did not involve a criminal or civil proceeding against those
whose privacy was invaded, the issue of alternative remedies
available for such violations was not addressed by the court. In-
deed, in no supreme court case has it been contended that pro-
77. Id. at 831, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
78. Only a few months prior to Porten, the court in Cain v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1976), indicated that an action
for damages would be cognizable under the constitutional right of privacy. In
Cain, the defendant insurance company allegedly sent investigators to conduct
surveillance of the plaintiff. This was apparently done to obtain evidence to use in
an impending legal action arising out of an auto accident in which the plaintiff was
involved. Cain is of particular interest here because the facts involved may paral-
lel situations in which exclusion of evidence in a civil action may be appropriate.
79. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis added).
80. See notes 24, 36 & 61 supra and accompanying text.
81. 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
82. Id.
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curement of information in a manner violative of constitutional
privacy rights for use as evidence in a civil case should be sanc-
tioned by exclusion of such evidence at trial.83
V. RATIONALE AND SOCIAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING A
"NEW" EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The California Supreme Court, which broke from the traditional
rules of evidence in Cahan by creating the criminal law exclu-
sionary rule, was in a position analogous to that which the mem-
bers of the court may face in the future when confronted with the
issue of whether to create a "new" exclusionary rule for purely
civil cases in situations where evidence was obtained in violation
of explicit constitutionally protected privacy rights. Accordingly,
the rationale advanced by the court in Cahan is germane to a dis-
cussion regarding the creation of a "new" exclusionary rule.
As previously discussed, the Cahan court based its decision to
create an exclusionary rule primarily on four rationale.8 4 These
will now be examined in light of their relationship to the propri-
ety of a "new" exclusionary rule.
A. The Imperative of Judicial Integrity
In reference to unlawful gathering of evidence by state officers,
the court stated that "out of regard for its own dignity as an
agency of justice and custodian of liberty the court should not
have a hand in such 'dirty business.' "8 5 Although the emphasis
in exclusion of evidence in criminal trials has shifted primarily to
the deterrence rationale in recent United States Supreme Court
decisions86, the judicial integrity rationale remains viable in Cali-
83. This was proposed in a criminal context, however, in People v. Moreno, 64
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 23, 135 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1976). In Moreno a motion to suppress
evidence was based both on the fourth amendment (also, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13)
and the California constitutional right of privacy, but was denied by the Appellate
Department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The fourth amendment
exclusionary rule was held inapplicable because there was no state action (on
principles of Randazzo) and the proposed exclusionary rule based on the right of
privacy was rejected on grounds that the fourth amendment rule was sufficient
protection of privacy rights in criminal cases.
84. See note 17 supra.
85. 44 Cal. 2d at 445, 282 P.2d at 912.
86. See Note, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: An Argument for Ex-
panding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L REV. 1129 (1973) for a
thorough analysis of the erosion of the judicial integrity rationale. Compare
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) where the Court refused to apply
245
fornia.87 Concern for the integrity of the judicial system should
not be restricted to criminal contexts. Fostering respect for the
courts should be an equally important goal in civil proceedings
where private citizens have come to a legal forum for adjudication
of their respective rights and duties as opposed to seeking redress
for personal wrongs by private efforts. Reiteration of the Califor-
nia Supreme Courts' statement in Redner that "[TIhe legal proc-
ess cannot be stultified by crowning such amoral maneuvers with
apparent success" 88, patently reveals the courts' desire to protect
the sanctity of the judicial system from all stealthy encroach-
ments.
B. The Deterrence Rationale
A second basis for exclusion of evidence advanced in Cahan
was that "given the exclusionary rule and a choice between secur-
ing evidence by legal rather than illegal means, officers will be im-
pelled to obey the law" rather than to jeopardize their
objectives.8 9 In criminal cases, the necessity for the exclusionary
rule as a deterrent to unlawful police conduct is significant be-
cause civil remedies have proven to be unsatisfactory to ade-
quately protect privacy rights afforded by the constitution. 90
The need for a "new" exclusionary rule in purely civil cases to
deter conduct invasive of personal privacy by private individuals
is dependent on two factors. First, whether alternative judicial
remedies in themselves would be an effective deterrent to such
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in a federal civil tax proceeding in which
evidence was unlawfully obtained by a state police officer without federal partici-
pation. The Court concluded that "exclusion . . . of evidence .. . has not been
shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so
that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion. This Court, there-
fore, is not justified in so extending the exclusionary rule." See also United States
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) which
deal with the issue of the exclusionary rule and its deterrent purpose.
87. Although the deterrence rationale has drawn the principle attention of the
California courts in determining whether to apply the criminal law exclusionary
rule, they have not expressly repudiated the judicial integrity argument. See 1
Cal. 3d at 641, 648, 654, 463 P.2d at 734, 739, 742, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 382, 387, 390; 69 Cal.
2d at 682, 446 P.2d at 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 805; People v. Parnham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385,
384 P.2d 1001, 1005, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501 (1963); Note, Imperative of Judicial Integ-
rity and the Exclusionary Rule, 4 WEST. ST. U. L REV. 1 (1976).
88. 5 Cal. 3d at 97, 485 P.2d at 809, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
89. 44 Cal. 2d at 448, 282 P.2d at 913.
90. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-54 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955); see also Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence
Illegally Obtained by Private Parties, 72 YALE L. J. 1062, 1070-71 (1963), where the
author suggests several reasons for the failure of civil actions as a deterrent to ille-
gal police activity. For example, the fear of subsequent police harrassment, the
likelihood that a jury would be sympathetic toward police over-zealousness and
the fact that policemen have a nearly judgment-proof status.
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actions and, second, whether the public would be sufficiently
aware of the existence of such a rule in advance of the commis-
sion of "privacy invading" acts in order to make exclusion a valid
deterrent to such actions. The first factor will be discussed in
depth below to retain continuity with the analogy to the Cahan
rationale. In reference to the second factor, the conduct of state
law enforcement officers in criminal prosecutions is presently the
target of the exclusionary deterrence. 91 State officers having been
formally trained for their duties are normally well apprised of the
exclusionary effects of wrongful search and seizure. By compari-
son, private litigants are less likely to have knowledge of such
rules, and it follows that the exclusion of evidence wrongfully ob-
tained would be less likely to have a significant deterrent effect.
Modern techniques of civil litigation, however, often call for the
services of professional private investigators. This is especially
true in many situations where the issue of acquisition of evidence
by intrusions upon the privacy of the opposing litigant would be
involved.92 Professional investigators whose business depends
upon the production of effective information would reasonably be
expected to know of such an exclusionary rule and, consequently,
be deterred from engaging in activities encroaching upon the per-
sonal privacy of others.93 Civil litigants cognizant of the exclu-
sionary rule would be, thereby, "impelled to obey the law" just as
are state law enforcement officers.
While the deterrent effect may not in itself provide complete
justification for the creation of a "new" exclusionary rule, it would
certainly provide an added measure of protection to personal pri-
vacy. This would be particularly true where alternative legal rem-
edies may not provide adequate protection.
91. 44 Cal. 2d at 448, 282 P.2d at 913.
92. E.g., private investigations conducted in connection with personal injury,
dissolution of marriage, and various types of insurance related litigation.
93. It must be pointed out that the exclusion of evidence on a privacy basis
would be likely to extend to evidence obtained in violation of only the opposing
litigant's privacy rights. The right of privacy (common law and constitutional) has
been held to protect only the interests of the one whose rights were violated, i.e.,
it is a purely personal right. See Cowing v. City of Torrance, 60 Cal. App. 3d 757,
131 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976); Hendrickson v. California Newpapers, Inc., 48 Cal. App.
3d 59, 121 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1975). See also L. JOHNS, CAuIFoRNIA DAMAGES LAW AND
PROOF, Invasion of Privacy § 11.1, at 361-62 (2d ed. 1977).
C. Adequacy of Remedies Protecting Constitutional Rights
Advancing a third rationale for a "new" criminal law exclusion-
ary rule Justice Traynor, speaking for the Cahan court, stated:
"[I]f courts are to discharge their duty to support the state and
federal Constitutions they must be willing to aid in their enforce-
ment ... Experience has demonstrated, however, that neither ad-
ministrative, criminal or civil remedies are effective in
suppressing lawless search and seizure."94 It is suggested here
that this rationale is equally applicable to purely civil proceedings
in many circumstances. As previously discussed, the right to
damages for physical invasion of privacy is well established in
California.95 The California Constitution privacy provision pro-
vides additional protections to privacy rights for which damages
may not in all situations give adequate redress. For example,
where invasions of privacy which would give rise to criminal sanc-
tions96 are minor in nature, those committing such acts are un-
likely to be prosecuted regardless of the devastating effects the
information acquired by such tactics may have as admissible evi-
dence in a civil proceeding.9 7 Likewise, civil actions would not be
expected to yield extensive damages where relatively insignifi-
cant offenses to privacy rights were perpetrated.9 8 This would be
especially true if the jury in such an action was aware of a prior
proceeding terminating in the present defendant's favor where
the disputed evidence was instrumental in the outcome. Also it
seems rather improbable that adequate damages for an invasion
of privacy would be awarded by a jury who sees the plaintiff as a
"wrongdoer."
D. Furtherance of Constitutional Purposes
The final ground for exclusion in Cahan was that the exclusion-
ary rule served to further the purpose of the constitutional provi-
sions involved: "[H Ie (the criminal) does not go free because the
constable blundered, but because the Constitutions prohibit se-
curing the evidence against him. Their very provisions contem-
plate that it is preferable that some criminals go free than that
the right of privacy of all the people be set at naught."99
In civil cases the traditional rule that all probative evidence is
94. 44 Cal. 2d 447, 282 P.2d at 913.
95. See generally, note 54 supra.
96. Such as trespass, electronic surveillance, etc.
97. See notes 50 & 51 supra.
98. See notes 50 & 51 supra. See also Comment, A Comment on the Exclusion
of Evidence Wrongfully Obtained by Private Individuals, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 271,
275.
99. 44 Cal. 2d 449, 282 P.2d at 914.
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admissible regardless of how obtained lo0 is juxtaposed against
the need for exclusion of evidence secured at the expense of ex-
press inalienable constitutional rights. Society's concern in civil
cases is not whether criminals are allowed to go free, but whether
private litigants should be permitted to benefit by introducing
into evidence information acquired by constitutionally forbidden
means. If a new exclusionary rule is deemed necessary to fully
protect constitutional privacy rights, arguments opposed to such a
rule should be addressed to the wisdom of the constitutional pro-
vision itself. The tenor of thought in the nation as a whole, and
particularly in California, has been increasingly directed toward
the desire for enhanced personal privacy.101 Thus, legislative and
judicial reactions to the "privacy movement" have created a
favorable attitude toward expansion and protection of such
rights. 102
The primary legal and social policy considerations upon which
the Cahan exclusionary rule was established appear also to favor
the creation of a new exclusionary rule for civil cases where con-
stitutional privacy rights are involved. Several other related fac-
tors warrant discussion at this point, as well.
First, the maxim that no one should profit from his own
wrong'0 3 would strongly support the exclusion of evidence wrong-
fully obtained in civil cases. Where the wrongful party is not
amenable to complete restitution to the party wronged by his
acts, he is indeed reaping an unfair profit from his improper con-
duct.
Second, those opposed to the criminal law exclusionary rule
created in Cahan argued that exclusion of evidence in criminal
cases was inconsistent with the rule allowing private litigants to
use evidence illegally procured.10 4 Today, with the acceptance of
the exclusionary rule in criminal cases, the situation is reversed.
Admission of evidence wrongfully obtained in civil cases is now
100. See note 1 supra.
101. See generally S. J. Ervin, The Right of Privacy, 64 ILL. B.J. 276 (1976);
S.Symms & P. Hawks, The Threads of Privacy: The Judicial Evolution of a "Right
of Privacy" and Current Legislative Trends, 11 IDAHo L. REV. 11 (1974); T. Towe, A
Growing Awareness of Privacy in America, 37 MONTANA L REV. 39 (1976).
102. Note 101 supra.
103. 2 POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (5th ed. 1941); B. WrrKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity §§ 7, 8, at 5232-34 (8th ed. 1974).
104. 44 Cal. 2d at 443, 282 P.2d at 910; see also Munson v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659,
166 P.2d 268 (1946).
incongruent with the well established criminal law exclusionary
rules. Accordingly, uniformity of such rules could now be at-
tained by recognition of a new exclusionary rule for civil cases. Fi-
nally, a brief look at the "balancing test" of Moore and
MartinezI0 5 involving admissibility of evidence in administrative
hearings would be instructive. If seen in the light of privacy pro-
tection, the test would weigh the policy underlying exclusion of
evidence against the interests involved in the particular proceed-
ing and the cost to society of extending exclusionary protections.
Having discussed the policy considerations at length above, the
remaining half of the balance as to the societal costs warrants ex-
amination. The types of proceedings dealt with previously (i.e.,
criminal, quasi-criminal and administrative) involved state inter-
ests significantly different than those present in purely civil cases.
In criminal and quasi-criminal actions the state has a substantial
interest in the protection of its citizenry from society's malefac-
tors. Also, administrative bodies act as an "arm of the court" in
the performance of their respective duties providing protection
for society as deemed necessary by state government. 0 6 How-
ever, in purely civil proceedings, the court is acting as a forum for
the litigation of claims and adjudication of personal rights and du-
ties of private parties. Consequently, the state would seemingly
have less justification in admitting evidence wrongfully obtained
in civil action than it would when, as in criminal prosecutions, the
protection and safety of society is involved generally. 107
Turning to the last element of the balance involving the costs to
society, some criticisms of the creation of a new exclusionary rule
will be considered. Initially, the traditional view propounds that if
rules of evidence are designed to enable courts to reach the truth,
it follows that all trustworthy and reliable information should be
105. See notes 30 & 33 supra and accompanying text.
106. See note 36 supra.
107. It is of course acknowledged that the state has a substantial interest in the
type of evidence admissible in civil cases in promoting and preserving the judicial
process as an effective and viable institution in society. It has been suggested that
there are three main bodies of the law of evidence pertaining to limitations and
restrictions on the admissibility of evidence. First, those limitations arising from
the expediency of the efficient functioning of the trial courts such as the exclusion
of unnecessary or cumulative evidence. Second, those evidentiary restrictions
dealing with the relevancy and materiality of facts presented to the issue in dis-
pute. Finally, those limitations stemming from public policy considerations such
as the attorney-client privilege or doctor-patient privilege and those rules dealing
with the competency of witnesses. It is within this third body of evidentiary rules
that the exclusion of evidence based on the manner and method of its procure-
ment falls. S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 1:8, at 9, 10 (6th ed. 1972). Thus, the
states' interest in admitting such unlawfully obtained evidence must be viewed
only within the scope of this third body of evidentiary law.
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placed before the court. 08 Exceptions to this view are found in
criminal, quasi-criminal and administrative proceedings where in-
dividual privacy rights are deemed superior to the need for all re-
liable information. 10 9 In these proceedings the potential cost to
society is high relative to the societal costs involved in the out-
come of purely private matters. A related argument provides that
the courts should not attempt to decide collateral issues." 0 This
argument reasons generally that the method by which the infor-
mation was procured is not in issue, rather the proper considera-
tion is whether such information is relevant to the case at hand.
This argument is countered by the reasoning that the courts need
not concern themselves with the "guilt" or civil liability of a per-
son wrongfully obtaining evidence at trial, rather, the court
merely refuses to admit such evidence thereby denying the party
any "profit" from his wrong as is presently done in criminal pro-
ceedings. It is also contended that the cost to society is high in
the delay and confusion caused by exclusionary rules."' There
appears to be nothing, however, that would prevent efficient judi-
cial dispatch of exclusionary issues outside the presence of jurors
such as is done in the criminal courts." 2
VI. CONCLUSION
A careful analysis of California court decisions since Cahan
reveals an expansionary trend in the area of exclusion of evi-
dence improperly obtained. Initial court departures from tradi-
tional rules of admissibility of evidence in criminal cases, and
subsequent expansion of exclusionary principles into quasi-crimi-
nal actions and various administrative hearings within a relatively
brief period of time, suggest a climate amenable to the creation of
a new exclusionary rule for purely civil cases.
108. Note 1 supra.
109. See notes 13, 24 & 36 supra and accompanying text.
110. Note 109 supra. See also Note, Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evi-
dence in Noncriminal Proceedings, 22 FLA. L. REV. 38 (1969).
111. Note 110 supra.
112. Exclusionary rules would probably be less frequently invoked in civil
cases due to the broad rules of discovery in California. See generally D. LOUISELL
& B. WALLY, MODERN CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY 2d §§ 1.01, 1.02, at 1-9, supp. 3 (1972 &
Supp. 1977). Such an exclusionary rule, however, would conceivably encourage
strict observance of limits of discovery and proper methods of evidentiary acquisi-
tion. See generally Conklin, Leahy & Condon, Evidence Obtained by Unlawful
Search and Seizure-Admissibility in Criminal and Civil Cases and Other
Proceedings, 20 TRIAL LAWYER GUIDE 49 (1976).
A constitutional provision explicitly granting a right of privacy
to all Californians provides a potentially sound basis for fashion-
ing such a rule. "Although the full contours of the new constitu-
tional provision have as yet not even tentatively been
sketched," 113 the constitutional right of privacy certainly appears
broad enough in scope to encompass activities undertaken to ob-
tain information for use at trial. This provision has also been con-
strued as an "inalienable right" calling for protection from private
as well as state acts.114
The principle considerations on which the criminal law exclu-
sionary rule was grounded are viable today and by analogy favor
creation of an exclusionary rule for civil cases. This, combined
with other important social policy factors, ostensibly outweighs
the traditional arguments raised against extension of exclusion-
ary principles. As eloquently stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland, in
Frank v. United States:
ISIince experience is of all teachers the most dependable, and since expe-
rience also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at
one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to
the experience of a succeeding generation whenever that experience has
clearly demonstrated the falacy or unwisdom of the old rule.
115
JERRY D. MACKEY
113. 13 Cal. 3d at 773, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
114. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
115. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
